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POLITICAL POLICING IN HONG KONG
H. L. Fu and Richard Cullen*
Modem states, democratic ones in particular, have grown to prefer the use of more
subtle, or at least less visible, police surveillance to open confrontation in a courtroom,
where the state itself may be scrutinised in public. Well-equipped national security
agencies enable the state to respond to potential security threats before they mature.
Hong Kong's political police unit, the Special Branch, was indispensable to Hong
Kong's colonial political order. Although it was disbanded before the handover of
Hong Kong to China in 1997, political policing and monitoring probably continue
under the new legal order. This article examines the historical origin of political
policing in Hong Kong, including the establishment of the Special Branch and its
initial focus on communist activity in Hong Kong. It then traces the demise of the
Special Branch prior to the handover, examines the role played by the Independent
Commission Against Corruption, and explores the relevance of political policing to
contemporary society.
Introduction
A politically motivated trial of an enemy of the state is also, as it happens, a
trial of the state itself. Modern states, democratic ones in particular, have
grown to prefer the use of more subtle, or at least less visible, police surveil-
lance to open confrontation in a courtroom, where the state itself may be
scrutinised in public. Over time, there has been a clear trend away from sub-
sequent punishment through political trials to more covert political
surveillance by national security establishments. Today, only "dictatorial" and
"authoritarian" states need resort to blatant violence against political
dissidents.
Western democracies have become national security and surveillance
societies. As political control has grown more preventative and proactive, it
has also become more expansive and assertive.' Well-equipped national
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security agencies enable the state to respond to potential security threats be-
fore they mature. Political dissidence is tolerated - but carefully watched.
Political trials have become largely unnecessary. In Western democracies today,
civil liberties are not manifestly threatened by classical political show trials,
but rather through the abuse of power by their national security agencies.
Most subversive activities are not charged or prosecuted as such. Charges of a
sensitive political nature, such as treason and sedition, are rarely made. Instead,
other laws, especially those governing societies and public order, are regularly
used to control dissenting political voices.
Yet every country needs to control and prohibit genuinely subversive
activities. The clandestine and deceptive nature of such activities, as well as
their not infrequently violent manifestations, mandate government watch-
fulness and firm counteractions. The fundamental problem is that the term
"subversion" can be defined to encompass a diverse group of underground
activities, typically resulting in the grant of broad mandates to security agencies.
Because "activities threatening to the national security often do not differ
outwardly from similar non-threatening ones",2 even legitimate dissent -
political, industrial and otherwise - can easily be categorised as subversive as
a result of government incompetence or political malevolence, or a combina-
tion of the two. In this context, "[c]ivil disobedience therefore becomes
subversive".'
Preventative Political Policing
Understanding preventative political policing is central to an understanding
of the operation of Article 23 of the Basic Law. The laws of treason and
sedition have almost never been used in Hong Kong. Similarly, laws govern-
ing public order have been used only occasionally to secure Hong Kong's
political stability. Instead, it is political policing, primarily through the former
Special Branch of the Hong Kong Police, that has played a crucial role in
suppressing subversive elements in Hong Kong. The Special Branch was in-
dispensable to Hong Kong's colonial political order. Though it was disbanded
before the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, political policing and
monitoring doubtless continue under the new legal order.
Political policing in Western democracies historically has had three fea-
tures which Hong Kong shares. First, it targets primarily leftist organisations,
in particular communist organisations. Well before the anti-communist hys-
teria of the Cold War era, communist activities were seen as threatening by
many Western democratic states. Political policing involved consistent
2 See Peter Gill, "Defining Subversion: The Canadian Experience Since 1977" (1989) Public Law 617,
633.
Laurence Lustgarten and lan Leigh, "The Security Service Act 1989" (1989) 52 Modem Law Review
801, 807.
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surveillance and harassment of communists and those among their supporters
who were perceived to be dangerous to the prevailing order.' In the United
States, surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was so ex-
tensive that "virtually no left-wing organisation, no matter how minuscule its
membership, escaped FBI tapping or bugging".s Likewise, the "unremitting
hostility" of the Canadian state to communism led to a systematic programme
to control the communist party, its followers and sympathisers.'
Second, political policing in modern democracies is increasingly preven-
tative and pre-emptive. Effective political control depends on effective
gathering of intelligence and pre-emptive action. This goal was achieved by
attending political meetings and infiltrating legitimate political movements,
following leaders of political movements and preparing blacklists. Before 1976,
"FBI internal security investigations emphasised collection of extensive po-
litical intelligence on organisations and individuals espousing revolutionary,
racist, or otherwise 'extremist' ideological viewpoints".' Investigation prac-
tices normally consisted of "monitoring the activities of these groups,
identifying their members and reading their publications". This high degree
of state vigilance brought the radical political movements of the day under
firm control.' As discussed below, the political complexion of groups under
FBI surveillance has changed since 1976. Recent events have also under-
scored the inadequacy of traditional methods of political control to meet these
new threats. Such failures illustrate the extent of Western states' reliance on
security agencies to ensure their political stability.
Finally, covert surveillance and harassment in modern democracies takes
place largely beyond the control of courts and the legislature. Instead, sole
discretion is vested in the security establishment and its political superiors.
Security matters are thus exempted from regular accountability mechanisms.
Lustgarten and Leigh comment that "perhaps the primary political function
of security is as a part of the coinage of power, hoarded and used by ministe-
rial and bureaucratic elites to ignore or short-circuit normal democratic
4 This discussion of the role of the FBI and other like organisations in countering subversion draws on:
James Kirkpatrick Davis, Spying on America: The FBI's Domestic Counterintelligence Program (New
York: Praeger, 1992); and Diarmuid Jeffreys, The Bureau: Inside the Modern FBI (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1995). For a study of political surveillance by state police, see Paul G. Chevigny, "Politics
and Law in the Control of Local Surveillance" (1984) 69 Cornell Law Review 735; John T. Elliff,
"The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Investigations" (1984) 69 Cornell Law Review 785; B. R.
Hancock, "The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service" (1973) 2 Auckland University Law Re-
view 1, 7-8.
Athan G. Theoharis, "The FBI and Dissent in the United States", in C.E.S. Franks (ed.), Dissent and
the State (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989), p 96.
6 Reg. Whitaker, "Left-Wing Dissent and the State; Canada in the Cold War Era", in C. E. S. Franks,
ibid., p 194.
John T Elliff, "The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Investigations" (1984) 69 Cornell Law
Review 785, 793.
8 Ibid., 789.
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process".' The use of subtle, ideally even undetectable, political surveillance
and harassment techniques has simply proven more effective in silencing dis-
senting voices than full-blown political prosecutions.
The Special Branch
Precursors to the Special Branch
Communist activities in Hong Kong came under close scrutiny in the early
part of the 20th century. The Guangdong-Hong Kong strike of 1925-1926,
which was organised by the Communist Party in China, posed a direct threat
to the security of Hong Kong.'0 As a result, Hong Kong Police started to
direct more serious attention to underground communist propaganda and lo-
cal organisations. A 1928 police report contained the following statement on
special political events:
"Following the defeat of the Communists in Canton in December, 1927,
there was a great decrease in anti-foreign agitation during the year. Anti-
Japanese feeling made itself felt in Hong Kong during May, 1928, in the
form of shop-window breaking and street oratory. The agitation was never
very strong and rapidly collapsed. During the year, Canton Authorities
devoted attention to the suppression of undesirable labour activities, and
throughout the year maintained a friendly attitude towards the British in
Hong Kong.""
Communist activities continued, however, despite police efforts. According
to a 1929 report:
"The suppression of the activities of Communists continued to be an im-
portant branch of Police work throughout the year. Communists have
failed to obtain any serious hold in Hong Kong, but frequent raids by Po-
lice reveal that the Communist Party still maintains, or seeks to maintain,
cells in Hong Kong. Their Agents are forced to conduct their activities
with great secrecy, and there is evidence that the personnel of the Party's
Representatives in the Colony are frequently changed. It is significant
that most of the Party's Agents who have passed through the hands of
the Police have been of the young student type, and appear to have been
9 Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh (n I above), p 363.10 See, for example, Chan Lau Kit-ching, "The Perception of Chinese Communism in Hong Kong
1921-1934" (2000) 164 The China Quarterly 1044.
Hong Kong Administrative Reports 1928, K19.
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controlled from Shanghai. Their efforts had been directed to cause trouble
among the labouring classes of the Colony.""
The biggest police success at this time was the arrest of 50 people during a
raid on "a Communist Meeting in full swing" and the deportation of the
principals."
By 1930, an Anti-Communist Squad had been established within the
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to monitor left-wing political
agitators. Reports describe a number of attempted demonstrations and strikes
organised by communists, followed by arrests and banishment. Two events
were of special importance. One was the proscription of a Chinese newspaper,
Siu Yat Po, apparently for involvement in communist activities. The paper
was closed by the Governor-in-Council and its manager and editor were
banished. Another was the on-duty killing in Yau Ma Tei by communists of a
Detective-Sergeant from the Anti-Communist Squad who had been attempt-
ing to obtain information about a communist anniversary.' 4 The killing
apparently intensified anti-communist operations. Thereafter, "considerable
further Anti-Communist Police activity ensued, revealing an important
organisation within the Colony which [had] been definitely suppressed for
the time being". 5
With greater resources the following year, the Anti-Communist Squad
continued its efforts to monitor the promotion and development of commu-
nist organisations in Hong Kong. The police actively gathered intelligence
on communist organisations, being particularly concerned about the involve-
ment of Bolshevists.' 6 In 1932, the Chinese name of the Anti-Communist
Squad was changed to Zhengzhibu, meaning Political Department.
Establishment of the Special Branch
The Anti-Communist Squad changed its English name the following year to
the Special Branch, apparently following British practice, while retaining their
Chinese "political" designation. The name changes may have reflected a new
institutional mandate, as anti-communist operations became increasingly
proactive. Though there were no serious demonstrations in the first few years
of the 1930s, the police continued to increase their resources. An increase at
that time in Bureau staff was said to have "enabled it to watch successfully the
general activities of the Communist Party in Hong Kong"."
12 [bid., Kl5.
'3 ibid.
'4 Hong Kong Administrative Report 1930, Kl4-K15. Colin Crisswell and Mike Watson, The Royal Hong
Kong Police (1841-1945) (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1982), p 123.
15 Hong Kong Administrative Report 1930, Kl5.
16 Hong Kong Administrative Report 1931, K3.
17 Hong Kong Administrative Report 1932, K4.
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According to the 1932 report, the police carried out raids before some of
the more important communist anniversaries and seized "quantities of in-
flammatory documents" intended to be distributed at related events. The raids
were followed by the arrest and banishment of communists." In the years
immediately following the establishment of the Special Branch, communist
organisations were kept under tight control. The police even claimed to have
arrested and banished "key members" of local communist organisations.'9 In
1935, they reported that the communist movement had collapsed, and no
communist activities were observed in 1935 or 1936." Even so, the Special
Branch continued to expand; by 1938 it had moved to a new building, largely
to accommodate the rapid influx of staff.
A report prepared by the Commissioner of Police in 1939 detailed the
work of the Special Branch. Their most important function was labelled "Chi-
nese Affairs". The report observed that "[a] number of new guilds and labour
associations were formed during the year, and together with older guilds, were
active in collecting subscriptions for Chinese war relief and Chinese national
welfare. Three small strikes occurred during the year."
Other Special Branch functions included immigration and passport con-
trol (for which they assumed responsibility in mid-1938) and the registration
of persons. The outbreak of war with Germany added a heavy burden on the
Branch, which then had to control enemy aliens and liaise with naval and
military authorities. 22
It appears that the Special Branch was not especially proactive during the
first decade of its existence. At the end of 1941, the Branch was criticised for
lacking "an 'underground' system of intelligence". Its chief means of obtaining
information were still reactive, usually involving raids, arrests and questioning
made after covert or otherwise unacceptable activity had taken place.23
Special Branch Activities 1949-1970
Expanded mandate
The victory of the Communist Party in mainland China in 1949 and the
subsequent Korean War increased the already heavy burden on the Hong
18 [bid., K5.
19 Hong Kong Administrative Report 1933, K7; Hong Kong Administrative Report 1934, K9.
20 Hong Kong Administrative Report 1935, K9; Hong Kong Administrative Report 1936, Kl4, After the
outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities, the Special Branch shifted its attention to monitoring anti-
Japanese activities. There were a number of new organisations set up in Hong Kong to identify
Chinese traitors and to boycott Japanese goods. There were also other minor anti-Japanese activities
such as stone throwing and the posting of slogans: Hong Kong Administrative Report 1937, Kl5; Hong
Kong Administrative Report 1938, K 11.
21 Hong Kong Administrative Report 1939, Kl 1.
22 Ibid., Kll.
23 Preliminary Report on the Hong Kong Police Force, Enclosure to Governor Sir Mark Young to Sec-
retary Lord Moyne, confidential letter, 1 Dec 1941 (CO129/588), cited in Steve Tsang (ed),
Government and Politics: A Documentary History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University
Press, 1995), p 169.
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Kong Special Branch. The Branch then had to contend with the threat of
communist infiltration. Its resources were stretched to cover a variety of tasks,
most of which still remained reactive in nature. By 1950, it claimed it was
facing "intense pressure".24 That year, the Branch introduced a programme of
"controlled immigration" from the Mainland, which meant that prior per-
mission to enter Hong Kong was required of passengers from Chinese ports.
Meanwhile, the Branch complained that "expansion hald] outstripped the
accommodation available and slum working conditions ha[d] obtained for
some considerable time"." In addition to its normal anti-subversion activities,
the Special Branch began to perform security checks for service and defence
purposes, which proved to be very demanding.
The Special Branch was also given responsibility for the enforcement of
the Registration of Societies Ordinance. Of 889 applications for registration
submitted in 1950, the Branch refused 141, apparently targeting mainly "left-
ist" organisations26 Another 150 applications were refused in 195 1,27 and
the same number was refused the following year."
After 1953, reports on the operation of political policing in Hong Kong sim-
ply ceased to appear. From 1955 to 1958, the only meaningful statement made in
annual police reports was that the Special Branch was "responsible for the
prevention and detection of activities subversive to the security of the Colony".
Focus shifts to security
Toward the end of the 1950s, the Special Branch started to improve its intel-
ligence-gathering capacity. In addition to the prevention and detection of
subversive activities, the Branch took increasing responsibility for "supplying
the intelligence necessary for the maintenance of internal security".2 9 Even
so, it was not until the early 1960s that meaningful progress was made, and it
took an MIS officer to effect the improvement. Thenceforth, the Branch "man-
aged to improve its counter-intelligence and counter-subversive capacities by
so much that it earned the reputation of being one of the best, if not the best
within the British Commonwealth by the second half of the 1960s". 0
The Zeng Zhaoke affair of 1961, named for a Police Superintendent found to
be a communist infiltrator, shocked the colonial administration and encouraged
24 Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force 1950-1951, p 33.
25 Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force 1951-1952, p 4 8.
26 Annual Report on Hong Kong Police 1950, pp 33-34.
27 Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force 1950-1951, p 33.
28 Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force 1951-1952, p 49.
'9 Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force 1958-1959, p 7 and Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force
1959-1960, p 7.
30 Steve Tsang (ed), Government and Politics: A Documentary History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University Press, 1995), p 173.
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further reforms.31 One of these was the transfer that same year of immigration
and passport control responsibilities to the Immigration Department, activities
that had previously consumed substantial Branch resources.
Branch manpower
As demonstrated in Figure 1, the strength of Special Branch forces almost
doubled between 1960 and 1970.32
Figure 1: Special Branch Staff Counts, 1957-1977
Year Regular Police Civilian Staff Total
1956-1957 165 52 217
1957-1958 216 67 283
1958-1959 218 90 308
1959-1960 230 103 333
1960-1961 235 110 345
1961-1962 248 109 357
1962-1963 262 136 398
1963-1964 319 140 459
1964-1965 340 130 470
1965-1966 379 155 534
1966-1967 409 172 581
1967-1968 419 189 608
1968-1969 438 195 633
1969-1970 479 204 683
1970-1971 506 212 718
1971-1972 504 213 717
1972-1973 / / /
1973-1974 628 248 876
1974-1975 631 278 909
1976 632 329 961
1977 627 329 956
(Source: Annual Repons on Hong Kong Police Force 1956-1977)
3 Luo Ya, Zhengzhibu Huiyilu (Memories of Special Branch, RHKP) (Hong Kong: Chinese University
Press, 1997), pp 140-147.32 lbid., p 5.
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Branch admission requirements
The quality and regulation of Special Branch agents had also improved since
the early 1960s. The Branch came to require that all applicants undergo a
thorough political review, termed "Position Vetting". This review spanned
from the beginning of the applicant's schooling through the time of application,
and included educational and occupational experiences, references, extra-
curricular and social activities, memberships in societies or organisations and
a check of all police records and other unconfirmed intelligence. In addition,
the backgrounds of spouses, parents, siblings, children and relatives of the
applicants were vetted. Once appointed, an officer was also subject to further
vetting from time to time, especially before promotion."
Most Special Branch agents were previously police officers of high
reputation, with the rank of inspector or above. They held university degrees
and could demonstrate skill in monitoring political activities. 4 Every Branch
agent also had to sign a copy of the Official Secret Act every six months, to
reinforce the crucial need for maintaining secrecy." Those assigned to the
Special Branch were not allowed to leave it before retirement. 6 Agents were
also required to report to their superiors whenever relatives from the Main-
land visited them.37
Effect of the Cultural Revolution
In 1966, the Cultural Revolution in mainland China spilled over to Hong
Kong, causing serious riots in the streets. By this time, though, the Special
Branch was ready to cope with just such a serious challenge. Tsang argues that
the Special Branch "was put to the test in the Communist confrontation of
1967 and it passed with flying colours"." The riots exposed the communist
organisation, which then "was badly damaged by the Special Branch and the
police in Hong Kong"."
The role of the Hong Kong Special Branch in these events was unusual in
many respects. Sinclair noted that: "[tihe unique geo-political situation of
1 Ibid., p 13.
3 Wen Sicheng, Xianggang Zhengfu Yu Shizhenghiagou (Hong Kong Government and its Executive
Structure) (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1994), p 141.
3 Luo Ya (n 31 above), p 14.
36 Hao Bin, Huangfia XianggangJingchadui (Royal Hong Kong Police Force) (Hong Kong: Haishan Tushu,
1985), p 175.
37 "Officers Speak of Working in Fear", South China Morning Post (SCMP), 26 July 1994. Reports claimed
that no active Special Branch agents were allowed to visit Taiwan or the Mainland, nor were those
who had left the Branch less than five years prior. Those who left the Branch more than five years
prior had to obtain approval in advance before visiting either place. Hao Bin, ibid., p 176. These
restrictions were finally lifted, perhaps because of the approaching handover. Their removal did not
initially have much impact on Special Branch agents, however, because "none of them dared to go to
the [M]ainland". It seems times have changed, as former agents now sometimes travel there as tourists.
3 Steve Tsang (n 30 above), p 292.
3 Ibid., p 297.
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Hong Kong poses special problems for [Special Branch] men. Political rivalry
between various groups from outside the borders of the territory causes head-
aches that are found nowhere else on earth and requires tactics and skills
developed to a rare degree of finesse." 0 One related function of the Special
Branch was the monitoring of potential political threats to the Government.
This required that they "keep a delicate finger on the pulse of potential po-
litical agitators"," including a variety of left and right wing political
organisations, labour unions and foreign organisations. The Special Branch
collected information on those organisations, including their members, ac-
tivities and financial resources.
At times, the Special Branch appeared to be omnipresent. When a South
China Morning Post reporter published a story on a possible increase in taxi
license fees in 1977, he received a visit from a Special Branch representative
asking for the source of the information.42 The Branch paid special attention
to leftist students at the University of Hong Kong. Between 1968 and 1969,
they asked the chairman of the Students' Association there more than once
for the names of students with a leftist orientation, allegedly to prevent them
from becoming civil servants after graduation." The Branch was also involved
in controlling industrial action,4 monitoring senior Chinese officials on their
visits to Hong Kong45 and guarding and interrogating communist and na-
tionalist spies held at their Victoria Road reception centre in Pokfulam.46
While the Special Branch recognised the threats posed by both sides of
the political spectrum, and purported to prevent and detect "subversive ac-
tivities of all kinds",4 it nevertheless admitted that "the Left were the greater
trouble makers and the more dangerous element".4 ' The right wing was seen
as mischievous, but communists were subversive.
40 Kevin Sinclair, Asia's Finest: An Illustrated Account of the Royal Hong Kong Police (Hong Kong: Uni-
corn Books, 1983), p 138.
41 Ibid., p 138.
42 Wen Sicheng (n 34 above), p 142.
4 Ibid., p 142.
4 "Concern Over Fate Of Activists: Special Branch Took Dissidents To China Border", SCMP, 26 July
1994. See also, Luo Ya (n 31 above), pp 119-120.
45 "Unforgivable Neglect", SCMP, 12 Nov 1994.
46 Glenn Schloss, "Return of Big Brother?", SCMP, 8 Mar 2001.
4 Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force 1946-1947, p 20; Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force
1947-1948, p 9. See also Fei Yi Ming and Lee Tsung Ying v R (1952) 36 HKLR 133.
48 Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force 1951-1952, p 49. Athan G. Theoharis, "The FBI and Dis-
sent in the United States", in C. E. S. Franks (n 5 above), p 96. While right wing groups were subject
to surveillance by the secret police, its intensity and scope paled in contrast to that suffered by the
left. In the US, for example, the monitoring of right wing organisations such as the KKK and some
pro-fascist organisations was exceptional, and in any event carefully limited. In Canada, the far right
was able to completely escape political monitoring during the Cold War, and until very recently, far
right organisations there regarded the police as "partners" in the salvation of Western society. C. E.
S. Franks, "Introduction", and Stanley Barrett, "The Far Right in Canada", in C. E. S. Franks (n 5
above), pp 13-14, 224-246.
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The Branch intervened in an incident on 1 March 1952" and was clearly
behind the successful prosecution of Ta Kung Pao for sedition in 1952.0 It
consistently monitored the Xinhua News Agency, as well as China-backed
organisations, including several companies in the Chinese Resources Build-
ing in Wan Chai, and many pro-China schools and companies, including
Gordon Wu's Hopewell Holdings. Visiting Chinese officers were followed, as
were many pro-Beijing figures - even members of the Chinese People's Politi-
cal Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and National People's Congress
(NPC). This last action came as no surprise to Mr Ng Hong-mun, a long-
time local NPC member, who claimed he knew he had been under surveillance
since the 1950s." Especially after the 1967 riots, communist organisations
were subjected to almost continual scrutiny by the Special Branch. The Branch
also regularly subjected members of such organisations to personal phone-
taps and surveillance.
Surveillance of other "subversive" groups
The right wing did not escape Special Branch surveillance completely. For
example, in 1976 Special Branch officers managed to detain a dozen right-
wingers who had planned to disrupt ceremonies organised by leftists to mourn
the death of Mao Tse-tung.52 Some 63 nationalist agents involved in espionage
and sabotage attempts against China were also arrested in Hong Kong." Later,
even pro-democracy activists attracted Special Branch attention. Elsie Tu, a
49 On 2 Nov 1951, a disastrous fire in Tung Tao Village consumed a large number of wooden huts. The
Government's response to the incident was criticised as unsatisfactory. The discontent of the public
towards the Hong Kong Government grew as disturbences following the fire became more serious. A
Canton Comfort Mission planned a visit to the fire victims on 1 March 1952. A group of Hong Kong
residents met to welcome the Comfort Mission. This action drew the attention and suspicion of the
Hong Kong Government. A large number of police were ordered to the railway station where the
Comfort Mission was expected to arrive, and the Mission was forbidden from entering Hong Kong. A
confrontation between the public and the police ensued. Many of the protesters were charged, and
some were deported. This incident became known as the "March First Incident" The People's Daily
published an article protesting the arrest and killing of some Chinese Hong Kong people by the Hong
Kong Government. The article was reprinted in Ta Kung Pa, which published other stories and
editorials relating to the event. The newspaper was charged with publishing a seditious publication
under s 4(1)(c) of the Sedition Ordinance, that is, printing, publishing, selling, offering for sale,
distributing or reproducing seditious publication and its proprietor-publisher, printer and editor were
arrested and prosecuted. Fei Yi Ming and Lee Tsung Ying v R (1952) 36 HKLR 133 and 156. For a
witness's description of the trial, see Zhou Yi, An History of Leftist Struggle in Hong Kong (Hong Kong:
Liwen Press, 2002), ch 8.
5o Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force 1952-1953, p 4 7.
51 Ada Yuen and Michelle Chin, "China-link groups on snoop list revealed", SCMP, 12 Nov 1994.
52 Kevin Sinclair, Asia's Finest: An Illustrated Account of the Royal Hong Kong Police (Hong Kong: Uni,
corn Books, 1983), p 138. For the Special Branch's control over agents from Taiwan, see Steven
Tsang, "Strategy for Survival: The Cold War and Hong Kong's Policy towards Kuomintang and Chi-
nese Communist Activities in the 1950s" (1997) 25 Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
294.
5 Kevin Sinclair, ibid., p 138.
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long time critic of the colonial government in Hong Kong, was another regular
victim of police surveillance."
The Branch was further involved in the handling of political dissidents
who fled from the Mainland. For example, Branch officers on reserve duty
allegedly escorted pro-democracy activists who fled the 1989 bloodshed in
Tian'anmen Square from the Immigration Department to police stations in
Sheung Shui and Fanling. It seems the officers' concern that some dissidents
might be returned across the adjacent border with mainland China was well
founded. One officer said that the Hong Kong Government later arranged for
dissidents "with value" to be escorted overseas - but "small potatoes" were
sent home.
Data collection
The Special Branch, like any other secret intelligence or security agency,
collected massive amounts of information in its files. The information gener-
ated by the Special Branch was then used by different government departments
to exercise other types of political control. In 1994, the colonial government
started to dispose of the secret files held by the Special Branch. Reportedly,
many of the sensitive files, including those on dissidents and other under-
ground movements, as well as those on matters related solely to the
responsibilities of the British Government, would be stored in Britain's new
Hong Kong Consulate. Some files would be destroyed. But most were to be
turned over to the new HKSAR Government.55
Restructuring Branch Functions in the 1970s
The official description of Special Branch functions changed gradually dur-
ing the 19 70s, becoming less political. In the 1974 Report of the Hong Kong
Police Force, the Special Branch was said to exist in order to prevent and
detect "subversive activities and for the collection, collation, assessment and
dissemination of intelligence necessary for the maintenance of good internal
security"." In the 1976 report, their mission statement was changed to "'pre-
vention and detection of subversive and espionage activities and the collection,
collation, assessment and dissemination of intelligence"." The decreased
prominence of internal security in the second description is seemingly bal-
anced by broader reference to intelligence duties.
5 "Political Activists Begin to Recognise the Tell-tale Signs", Hong Kong Standard, 20 Sept 1999.
5 Chris Dobson, "Sensitive Documents to be Destroyed Before 1997: Classified Files Destined for UK",
SCMP, 23 Jan 1994. The Security Wing is still in possession of many sensitive personal files. It has
files on members of the April Fifth Action Group, and was willing to disclose a copy of the personal
file on one of the members when he complained that he had been subjected to heavy police
surveillance. May Sin-mi Hon, "Security Chiefs Allow Protester To View His File: Complaint Over
Police Surveillance", SCMP, 2 Mar 1998.
56 Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force 1973-1974, p 10.
5 Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force 1976, p 25.
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Anticipating Re-unification with Mainland China
From 1983 on, official descriptions of the Special Branch ceased to mention
its customary role in the prevention and detection of subversive activities
and intelligence gathering, largely in response to Sino-British negotiations
on the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong back to China. Thereafter,
the Special Branch was simply described as undertaking "the duties normal to
a Special Branch including VIP protection, counter-terrorism and security
co-ordination".
By 1987, the Hong Kong Government was seriously reviewing the future
role of the Special Branch. It was clear that monitoring of leftist activities
and pro-China individuals and organisations would not be relevant after the
handover. There were also other reasons to restructure the Branch. First, the
Government wanted to prevent potentially embarrassing and sensitive infor-
mation from being revealed to the new Government after July 1997.
Something needed to be done to protect those who served in the Branch, as
well as the huge number of files in their possession. In addition, the fear of
prosecution after reunification was rife among Branch officers who had worked
in the frontline against communist sympathisers, despite repeated assurances
from China that police officers would not be punished for their previous anti-
communist activities.59
Phasing Out the Special Branch
Towards the end of the 1980s, the Government decided that the Special
Branch would be gradually phased out. In 1988, the Special Branch reported
that it had completely halted any new recruitment. The Government set up
a HK$600 million premature retirement fund so that the 1,000 Branch officers,
most of whom were privy to sensitive information, could resettle in the United
Kingdom, along with their families.60 The pre-handover Government was
determined to disband the Branch, hoping it would be only a distant memory
by the time reunification occurred.
But there was a need for at least some Branch functions to be taken over
by other government departments. It was clear that counter-terrorism, counter-
intelligence and vetting functions would still need to be performed. Even the
Preparatory Working Committee (PWC) suggested that it might be possible
to re-establish the Special Branch after its disbandment to deal with Taiwan-
related and other overseas affairs." In 1993, the police started to make public
58 Annual Report on Hong Kong Police Force 1983, p 48.
5 "The Special Branch of the Police will not be disbanded but will just be renamed after '97", Huaqiao
Daily, 16 Sept 1993. H. L. Fu, "The Form and Substance of Legal Interaction Between Hong Kong
and Mainland China: Towards Hong Kong's New Legal Sovereignty", in Raymond Wacks (ed), The
New Legal Order in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999).
6o S. Y. Yue, "Chart Backs Ex-Special Branch Officers' Passport Bid; Officers Performed 'Sensitive'
Duties", SCMP, 30 July 1994.
61 "The Special Branch May Be Restored After 1997", Sing Tao Daily, 24 June 1995.
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statements that the Special Branch was to stay in one form or another, and
new recruits replaced those who settled in the United Kingdom."2 By year's
end, the police force was undergoing a restructuring. Following recommenda-
tions by consultants Coopers & Lybrand, the Operations Department of the
police was divided in two. A new position, titled Director of Crime and
Security, was created to share the work of the Director of Operations. A Se-
curity Wing, loosely styled on the FBI, would assume responsibility for some
Special Branch tasks after the latter disbanded in 1995.6
Apart from rationalising the structure of the force, another important rea-
son for creating the Security Wing, according to a police source, was:
"to find a convenient home for Special Branch officers when the depart-
ment [disbanded] in 1995. Since there are certain similarities between the
[Special Branch] and the [Criminal Investigation Division] it [was] rea-
sonable and appropriate for the former to come under [the] new Crime
and Security Wing."6 4
Disbanding the Special Branch
The Special Branch was formally dissolved in 1995. Effective 1 July 1995, the
Director of Crime and Security assumed official responsibility for the former
Branch's work. The view then was that the Security Wing would be able to
cope with the future security requirements of Hong Kong. Allegedly, its func-
tions have remained essentially the same since the 1995 re-organisation. 65 At
the end of 1997, the Security Wing of the HKSAR Police Force had 429 staff
members, including 86 civilians, working under the Director of Crime and
Security.66 By 2001, the total number of staff in the Wing fell to 411, but
reportedly had still "fluctuated around that level since 1996-97".67
Vetting of Government Officials in Hong Kong
Combined Roles - The Special Branch and ICAC
Prior to 1994, before an applicant to a civil service position could be ap-
pointed or a government official promoted, he or she had to be investigated.
The process included a check for any criminal records the applicant or offi-
cial might have, as well as a review called political or security vetting. 8
62 Marcal Joanilho, "Secretive Squad To Stay In '97", Hong Kong Standard, 27 Jan 1992.
63 Provisional Legislative Council Panel on Security Minutes (PLC Paper No. CB(2) 976), 18 Dec 1997,
available at http://wwwlegco.gov.hk. Jimmy Leung, "New Post As Police Force Sees Big Revamp",
SCMP, 15 Dec 1993.
64 Provisional Legislative Council Panel on Security Minutes, ibid. and Jimmy Leung, ibid.
65 Provisional Legislative Council Panel on Security Minutes, ibid.
66 Ibid. and Jimmy Leung (n 63 above).
67 Glenn Schloss, "Return of Big Brother?", SCMP, 8 Mar 2001.
68 Report of the ICAC Review Committee (Dec 1994), ch 17. See also Luo Ya (n 31 above), pp 242-245.
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Responsibility for the criminal record check rested with the police, while
"political vetting" was entrusted to the Special Branch. After it was established,
the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) also shared some
responsibility for the vetting process,"9 but its role was limited to matters
relating to corruption.70
The vetting process included a detailed check of the applicant or official's
political background to see, among other things, whether he or she had
organised any student movements in school or had relatives working in leftist
organisations.71 Those with any connection to the left would have their ap-
plication or promotion rejected" After the decision to formally disband the
Special Branch in 1995, the Government had to find another body to take
over the vetting function of the Special Branch. The ICAC was the natural
candidate.
Proposed ICAC Assumption of Vetting Function
In November 1993, Jim Buckle, then Acting Commissioner of the ICAC,
proposed to the Legislative Council (LegCo) Establishment Sub-committee
that the ICAC take up the Special Branch's vetting responsibilities. 3 His
proposal included the creation of a new position, termed Deputy Director of
Operations. The vetting role would apparently be filled by the Operations
Department of the ICAC. Other government officials also indicated that this
shift was about to occur. The Director of Administration, Mr Richard Hoare,
stated in 1994 that the ICAC would be given responsibility for political vetting,
although the transfer of Special Branch functions would not be accompanied
by the transfer of classified files. 1
The LegCo received the proposal with suspicion. Although the legislators
endorsed the ICAC's request, they expressed clearly their concern that the
ICAC might abuse its new powers. The legislators took up the issues on 10
January 1994. They were worried that the ICAC could become a new "secret
police force" in Hong Kong. Emily Lau questioned why the vetting role should
be passed to the ICAC and not other units of the Hong Kong Police. 7 The
legislators common concern was that the ICAC, an independent anti-cor-
ruption body, might be politicised if it was asked to vet government officials.
6 Report of the ICAC Review Committee (Dec 1994), ch 17. See also, Luo Ya, ibid., pp 242-245.
70 The ICAC Commissioner, Bertrand de Speville, said that the ICAC then performed only "integrity"
checks. Connie Law, "Doubts On ICAC Vetting Role", SCMP, 11 Jan 1994.
71 Wen Sicheng (n 34 above), p 8.
72 Wen Sicheng, ibid., p 8.
7 Linda Choy, "ICAC Extends Vetting Role. Concern At Screening Of Top Civil Service
Appointments", SCMP, 17 Nov 1993.
7 Chris Dobson, "Sensitive Documents To Be Destroyed Before 1997: Classified Files Destined For
UK", SCMP, 23 Jan 1994.
7 Connie Law, "Doubts on ICAC Vetting Role", SCMP, 11 Jan 1994.
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The legislators demanded that if the ICAC was to take over the vetting
function, the LegCo should have control over the appointment of the ICAC
Commissioner."
To allay these fears, the Government insisted that the ICAC would only
undertake "integrity" (ie corruption-related, and not political) checking. Both
the ICAC and the Security Bureau pledged that the ICAC would not under-
take any type of political monitoring. The Deputy Secretary for Security at
the time, Jim Morris, claimed that "no political element would be involved
in the vetting and the ICAC would not undertake political monitoring of
any type"." In a letter to Sing Tao Daily, the ICAC affirmed that it had only
been performing integrity vetting, and its future function would be limited to
that role." LegCo was told that "the ICAC was interested only in checking
people's background, through their records, for possible corruption".79 "In-
tegrity" would only be checked against the ICAC's records and information
provided by the civil servants themselves, followed by interviews. 0
Many felt the distinction drawn by the ICAC between integrity vetting
and political vetting was dubious. As legislator James To pointed out, "integ-
rity may include a person's political inclination". It was always possible that
information about integrity could be deployed for political purposes.8 i Leftist
organisations were equally suspicious. Wen Wei Po alleged that the ICAC had
already played a political policing role in Hong Kong, noting that some pro-
China agitators were silenced after "being invited for coffee" by the ICAC,
while some even began vocally attacking their fellow pro-China people."
The Tsui Affair
A subsequent scandal confirmed the suspicions of Legco members. After dis-
missal from his position as the Deputy Director of Operations of the ICAC
on 10 November 1993, Alex Tsui appeared before LegCo to deliver some
electrifying - but largely expected - testimony." According to Tsui, as the
Special Branch scaled down its activities, the ICAC was expanding its own
intelligence role. In this way, the ICAC was in the process of becoming Hong
Kong's new political police. He further alleged that another secret department,
the Technological Services Branch, had been established in the ICAC in
76 "Several Political Parties Discuss ICAC Work", Xin Bao, 30 Jan 1994.
7 Connie Law (n 75 above).
78 "CAC Has Not Taken Over The Special Branch", Sing Tao Daily, 3 Mar 1995.
79 Linda Choy (n 73 above).
80 Michael Smith, "'Special Branch' is under scrutiny", Hong Kong Standard, 11 Jan 1994.
81 Zhong Jian, "Suspicion over the ICAC and the Special Branch", Hong Kong Economic Times, 18 Apr
1994.
82 Wen Sicheng, "The Special Branch after the Transitional Period", Wen Wei Po, 17 May 1994.
83 Tsui purported that one of the reasons for his sudden dismissal was that he objected to imposition of
Special Branch-style political vetting functions on the ICAC, as ordered by his superior.
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response to the anticipated disbandment of the Special Branch.' He claimed
as an example of this shift that the ICAC had tapped the phones of senior
government officials, including that of former Executive Councillor, Rita Fan.
In another instance, the ICAC had investigated a senior government officer,
Yeung Kai-yin, for his close relationship with Xinhua News Agency, prompt-
ing him to resign from his post as the Secretary for Transport.
More seriously, Tsui alleged that the ICAC was collecting evidence of
"dirty doing[s]" by businessmen and politicians, to be used by the British
Government after reunification.s The Governor and the ICAC Commis-
sioner categorically denied that the Commission's work had been politicised
in any way.
On 11 May 1994, LegCo again addressed the vetting of senior civil ser-
vants by the ICAC,86 particularly the type of checking termed "'extended
checking"." During the debate, the Secretary for the Civil Service repeated
that the ICAC was involved solely in integrity checking. According to the
Secretary, "[t]he purpose of integrity checking is to ensure that the Civil Ser-
vice is staffed by persons of high integrity"." He also stated that "the ICAC
has a role to play in ensuring a clean civil service. Integrity checking was no
more than an extension of their corruption prevention function.""
Furthermore, under the proposed integrity checking system, it was legal for
"'the ICAC to co-ordinate the record checks and to conduct interviews". 90
However, in his written answer to a question raised by legislator James To,
the Secretary made clear that "[i]t would be unlawful if the [ICAC] were to
use its statutory powers in the integrity checking process".9' As far as ex-
tended checking was concerned, he claimed the process "depends on
information provided by the civil servant voluntarily. The information pro-
vided will be confirmed (or otherwise) at interviews with referees nominated
by the subject and his senior officers."92 Vetting would be carried out by a
team of civilians working under the police Director of Criminal Investigations,
subject to the authority of the Civil Service Branch (CSB) . In considering
8 Louis Ng and Greg Torode, "ICAC 'A Secret Service' ", SCMP, 28 Apr 1994.
85 Louis Ng and Linda Choy, "Tsui Accused ICAC Of Political Vetting", SCMP, 15 Apr 1994.
86 Hong Kong Hansard, 11 May 1994, 3665-3669.
87 It is understood that extended checking only applies to officials at the D5 level (ie department heads)
who seek promotion or transfer, and to those who have held senior posts for at least five years. Chris
Dobson, "Civilians Carrying Out Policy; Committee Given More Time To Consider Shift In Vetting
Duty To ICAC", SCMP, 9 Oct 1994.
88 Hong Kong Hansard, 11 May 1994.
89 Ibid., 3667.
90 Ibid. In the Report of the ICAC Review Committee, it was stated that the Administration claimed
that the role of vetting by the ICAC was in compliance with s 12(d)-(f) of the Independent Com-
mission Against Corruption Ordinance. Report of the ICAC Review Committee (Dec 1994), para 17.8.
91 Hong Kong Hansard, 11 May 1994, Annex I.
92 Ibid.
9 Chris Dobson, "Civilians Carrying Out Policy; Committee Given More Time To Consider Shift In
Vetting Duty To ICAC", SCMP, 9 Oct 1994.
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the issue, the ICAC Operations Review Committee advised the ICAC to
continue performing its existing responsibilities, but warned it would be in-
appropriate for it to adopt the extended check duties previously reserved for
the Special Branch."
The Inquiry into Leung's Resignation
The forced early retirement of Immigration Director Laurence Leung further
illustrated the difficulties of distinguishing between political and integrity
vetting. On 6 July 1996, the Government announced that the former Direc-
tor of Immigration would retire for personal reasons, effective that same day.
Leung also claimed that his retirement was prompted by personal reasons.
Nonetheless, his sudden retirement aroused much concern and speculation.
The LegCo appointed a select committee on 23 October 1996 to inquire into
the circumstances behind Leung's suspicious departure. 95
Initially, the Government continued to assert under inquiry that Leung
retired on his own initiative, for personal reasons. Government witnesses re-
fused to disclose details of Leung's personal circumstances on the grounds of
confidentiality, the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance and public interest
immunity.96 However, they were quickly put on the offensive after Leung
disclosed in his LegCo testimony that he was, in fact, forced to retire because
the Secretary for Civil Service told him the Hong Kong Government no
longer trusted him. The Chief Secretary alleged that the Government's con-
templation of Leung's retirement was based on information gathered by the
ICAC." In a draft letter (intended to be issued to Leung if he refused to retire
voluntarily) the Secretary for Civil Service stated that the ICAC had uncov-
ered four incidents "which caused the Government to have doubts about Mr
Leung's personality, integrity and judgement as a senior officer and his suit-
ability to remain in the service", though no criminal offence was substantiated
after an ICAC investigation." According to the Government, these four
findings were confirmed during an extended check of Leung conducted in
November 1995."
94 Report of the ICAC Review Committee (Dec 1994), para 17.12.
95 Legislative Council, Report of the Select Committee to Inquire into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Departure of Mr. Leung Ming-yin From the Government and Related Issues, Vol. 1: Report and Minutes of
Proceedings (June 1997).
96 Ibid., ch 2.
97 Ibid, para 2.24.
98 Ibid., ch 2,
99 The Government alleged four examples of misconduct, namely Leung's failure to: (a) report to the
Civil Service Branch or repay a loan obtained from the Government, under the Housing Loan Scheme,
to purchase property in Canada in a timely manner; (b) fully disclose his investments in several
private companies; (c) fully disclose to the Secretary for Security a business relationship he entered
into with a Member of LegCo; and (d) adequately report to the Secretary for Security an investment
he made in a mainland advertising company (which was later wound up for failure to obtain a busi-
ness licence). Ibid., para 2.32.
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After the announcement of Leung's retirement, however, many media
comments, "particularly in the British press", suggested there might be politi-
cal motives behind the incident. 100 It was reported that Leung had leaked
confidential information to the Chinese authorities without permission. The
reports further alleged that Leung had:
1 given the right to print HKSAR passports to a pro-China company;
2 disclosed sensitive information to Chinese officials, primarily relating
to Chinese dissidents in Hong Kong, the nationality status and over-
seas right of abode of senior Hong Kong Government officials and the
beneficiaries of the British Nationality Selection Scheme; and
3 reached an agreement to increase the quota of "one-way permits" for,
and permitted the unauthorised provision of such permits to, main-
land Chinese who wished to settle in Hong Kong.'o
The Government and Leung denied the allegations. However, the con-
clusion reached by the Select Committee was that:
"the Committee has not been able to conduct a thorough investigation
into these claims outside the territory due to the lack of the necessary
lawful authority and the resources to do so, [therefore] the Committee is
unable to arrive at a definitive conclusion concerning the truth or other-
wise of the claims."'02
Ultimately, the Committee equivocated, saying that, "[o]n the basis of the
evidence received, the Committee cannot conclude that political motives
were involved in the circumstances surrounding Mr Leung's departure from
the Government, although it is unable to rule out that possibility".103
Vetting Procedures
Upon the request of the Select Committee, the CSB produced a letter setting
out details of the vetting system."' In the letter, the CSB first made clear
that "security vetting" had ceased to exist in 1994.105 Thereafter, only "integ-
rity checking" had been performed: "The purpose of the integrity checking
system is to ensure that serving and potential employees are of good character
and high integrity. The system serves to contribute to public confidence in
100 ibid., ch 4.
1o1 lbid., ch 4.
102 Ibid., ch 5.
103 Ibid., para 5.3.
0 Legislative Council, Report of the Select Committee to Inquire into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Departure of Mr. Leung Ming-yin From the Government and Related Issues, Vol. 11: Minutes of Evidence,
(June 1997), Doc No. SE/E/010.
105 Ibid.
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the civil service."o6 According to the CSB, the vetting system could be di-
vided into three levels of checks: appointment, normal and extended.
Appointment checking is performed on all applicants for civil service posts.
At this level, only "checks against criminal and ICAC records of details pro-
vided by applicants" are required.o10 Normal checking applies to "candidates
or serving officers who are being considered for appointment to ranks or posts
having access to material which offers scope for possible corrupt activities or
other forms of pressure on the officer".'08 Like appointment checking, this
process depends on the co-operation of applicants / officers, because only in-
formation provided by them will be checked.' Finally, extended checking is
reserved for "[o]fficers who are being considered for appointment to very se-
nior posts or posts requiring a particularly high degree of trust and integrity"."i0
This level of checking is the most thorough and does not rely upon the co-
operation of the person being checked: "The checks are requested by the
Secretary for Civil Service, as necessary, and comprise interviews with the
candidate, his referees and superiors[,] as well as record checks.""'
Telephone Tapping
Under Section 33 of the Telecommunications Ordinance 1966
The Hong Kong Government has extensive power to intercept communications.
The governing legislation is section 33 of the Telecommunication Ordinance
(TO), enacted in 1962 and based on a similar law in the United Kingdom." 2
When the section was first read to LegCo, the Government did not
explain clearly what the legal basis for telephone tapping was, and it went
unchallenged."' Section 33 provides:
"Whenever he considers that the public interest so requires, the Governor,
or any public officer authorised in that behalf by the Governor either gen-
erally or for any particular occasion, may order that any message or any
class of messages brought for transmission by telecommunication shall not
be transmitted or that any message or any class of messages brought for
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid. Deputy Commissioner of Inland Revenue Agnes Sin Law Yuk-lin and her husband were pros-
ecuted for deception in relation to a housing allowance. The evidence was gathered during Agnes
Sin's candidacy vetting for the Commissioner of Inland Revenue position. Chris Wong, "Tax Boss
Escapes Jail Term", SCMP, 19 Dec 2000.
11 Legislative Council, ibid.. The police were in charge of extended checking. Mr Tsang Yam-pui, Deputy
Commissioner of Police, briefed a LegCo Select Committee on the operational procedures of the
checking system. Ibid., para. 2.33.
112 Hong Kong Hansard, 28 Nov 1962, pp 332-335.
" Hong Kong Hansard, 19 Dec 1962, pp 333 and 349-350.
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transmission, or transmitted or received or being transmitted, by
telecommunication, shall be intercepted or detained or disclosed to the
Government or to the public officer specified in the order."
Defining the "Public Interest"
"Public interest" is the only ground section 33 requires before the Governor
(now the Chief Executive) may approve telephone taps. The Secretary for
Security stated in LegCo on 11 November 1992 that "orders under section 33
of the Telecommunication Ordinance to intercept telephone transmissions
are made only when the public interest so requires and only in cases involv-
ing the prevention or detection of serious crime, including corruption, or in
the interests of the security of Hong Kong"." 5
This grant of expansive power to tap telephone lines has been criticised,
primarily because it requires that applications be tendered to the Governor
(or the Chief Secretary) instead of to a court. The Governor, before granting
a given request, is to examine personally whether public interest requirements
are met."6 However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to expect the Governor
to strike a fair balance between an individual's rights and the Government's
interest."' As a result, his tapping powers have frequently been exercised
against those who simply did not follow the same line (in respect of political
and / or economic standpoints) as the Government. They were more espe-
cially used against political rivals of the ruling government.' II As mentioned
above, during the LegCo inquiry into his dismissal, Alex Tsui alleged that the
ICAC had tapped the telephones of political figures in Hong Kong.' '9 Demo-
cratic legislator Lau Chin-shek also claimed he knew that the telephone at
his workplace was always tapped."' Even as recently as the year 2000, Demo-
cratic Party politicians were allegedly informed that their phones were being
tapped. The tip-off, from unidentified "security officials", attributed the taps
in part to the right-of-abode controversy then dividing the Government."'
In practice, once an application was made on the grounds of "public inter-
est" no further details were required."' This broad latitude in tapping criteria
could easily be exploited by the Government. Further compounding the
problem, in 1995 the ICAC's physical capacity for telephone tapping was
increased. Reports then alleged that in order to increase its surveillance
potential, the ICAC had bought new tapping facilities and recruited more
114 Section 33, TO.
"5 Hong Kong Hansard, 11 Nov 1992, p 634.
116 bid.
"7 Hong Kong Hansard, 27 June 1997 available at http://www.legco.gov.hk, p 1492.
"* Hong Kong Hansard, 27 June 1997 available at http://www.legco.gov.hk, p 1500.
l9 "ICAC Raises Capacity For Telephone Tapping", SCMP, 9 July 1995.
120 Hong Kong Hansard, 27 June 1997 available at http://www.legco.gov.hk, p 1490.
12 Glenn Schloss, "Careful - They May Hear You", SCMP, 21 Aug 2000.
122 Hong Kong Hansard, 27 June 1997 available at http://www.legco.gov'.hk, p 1491.
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officers. With the addition of this equipment and manpower, the number of
telephone lines which the ICAC could monitor at any one time increased
from 50 to 80.123
ICAC Review of 1994
Largely as a result of Tsui's allegations, the ICAC's telephone tapping powers
were brought before the ICAC Review Committee in 1994. During the re-
view process, the Head of the ICAC Operations Department claimed that the
power of tapping was only used in the investigation of serious corruption cases
where the requested information could not be obtained by other means. 24
The ICAC Commissioner also assured the Review Committee that the agency
had never engaged in any political vetting, nor would it do so in the future. 12
The Review Committee acknowledged that tapping powers were important
in the investigation of serious corruption cases, but emphasised that it was
not fully satisfied with the accountability mechanism then in place. It sug-
gested that in order to prevent the ICAC from abusing its power to tap
telephones as part of general investigations, the nature of the crime to be
investigated, the information to be obtained and the duration of the tap should
be stated clearly in any application for a tapping warrant. In addition, the
Review Committee suggested making a comparison with Australian and British
tapping procedures for possible improvements."' In mid-1996, over a year
after the Review Committee proposed amendments to the relevant laws, its
Chairman publicly complained of the LegCo response, claiming "administra-
tive changes had been made, but legal changes were lagging". She argued,
"[t]he longer we delay, the [longer] ICAC power will stand as it is now rather
than be amended in the way the [Review Committee] has recommended". 127
Serious concerns remain about the allocation of tapping powers in Hong Kong.
Right to Privacy
Legislators were right to trace the source of tapping abuses to the procedures
under section 33 of the TO. These are regarded by some as inconsistent with
Article 14 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO) and Article 30 of the
Basic Law, which prohibit arbitrary and unlawful interference with the right
to privacy. Former Governor Chris Patten pointed out that the TO was
one of the laws he wished to review for possible conflicts with the BORO. 28
Many institutions, such as the Department of Justice, the Hong Kong Bar
123 "[CAC Raises Capacity For Telephone Tapping", SCMP, 9 July 1995.
124 Report of the ICAC Review Committee (Dec 1994), ch 17. See also, Luo Ya (n 31 above), para 6.6.1u5 Report of the ICAC Review Committee, ibid. See also Lua Ya, ibid., para 6.29.
126 Report of the ICAC Review Committee, ibid. See also Lua Ya, ibid., para 6.30.
127 Jonathan Hill, "Legco 'Failing to Curb ICAC'; Lawmakers Have Not Acted on Review, Watchdog
Says", SCMP, 19 May 1996.
128 Hong Kong Hansard, 27 June 1997 available at http://www.legco.gov.hk, p 1488.
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Association and international human rights organisations, urged the Gov-
ernment to provide greater legal protection against telephone tapping."
Legislators also repeatedly raised concerns about this issue in LegCo meetings.
Eventually, in 1996, the Privacy Sub-Committee of the Law Reform Com-
mission of Hong Kong published a consultation paper on regulating the
surveillance and interception of communications. 30 One of its objectives
was to examine and improve procedures relating to telephone tapping by law
enforcement agencies. A report on the consultation process (the Privacy
Report) was then published in December 1996.131 The report concluded that
the application procedure established under section 33 of the TO was unsat-
isfactory because it was not "sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an
adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on
which interceptions may be authorised".'32 In the Privacy Report, the Com-
mission detailed nine specific problems it perceived in the section 33
procedures:
1 the grounds on which tapping might be carried out were not adequately
specified;
2 no justification was required when tapping applications were made to
the Governor (or Chief Secretary);
3 the authorising officer was not required to ensure that the information
sought by the applicant could not reasonably be obtained by other, less
intrusive means;
4 the duration of tapping warrants was not restricted;
5 blanket authorisation for tapping could be given, because there were
no requirements for the appropriate content of an order;
6 no independent body was empowered to monitor on a regular basis the
granting of warrants;
7 the officer "making" an order or warrant was not accountable to the
public at large, nor was he required to report on its issuance or
implementation;
8 no specific provisions were made for judicial or administrative review
as to the legality of individual tapping warrants; and
9 no judicial or administrative remedies were provided for those who
suffered from improperly authorised tapping.133
129 Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on Privacy: Regulating the Interception of Communica-
tions (Dec 1996) (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1996) (hereinafter Privacy Report), para 45.
130 Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Privacy: Regulating Surveillance and the Interception of Com-
munications- Privacy Sub-committee Consultation Paper (Apr 1996) (Hong Kong: Government Printer,
1996).
131 Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (n 129 above).
132 Ibid., para 3.45.
133 Ibid., para 3.44.
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Effect of UK Developments and Malone's Case
Developments in the United Kingdom also helped provide a catalyst for re-
form in Hong Kong. In Malone v United Kingdom' the European Court of
Human Rights decided, in 1984, that the applicable UK law, which Hong
Kong had followed, failed to "indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and
manner of exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on public authorities.
To that extent, the minimum degree of legal protection to which citizens are
entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society is lacking.""' The Eu-
ropean Court decided that the power granted to the British Government to
tap telephone conversations contravened Article 8 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.'" The UK Interception of Communications Act was
passed in 1985 to bring UK law into conformity with this decision.
The combined impact of the European case and the Privacy Report forced
the Hong Kong Government to issue a consultative White Bill on the Inter-
ception of Communications."' The Government refused to table the bill in
LegCo, however, fearing it might not receive sufficient support."I Legislator
James To then proposed a Private Member's Bill on Interception of Commu-
nications and tabled it himself for discussion on 23 April 1997.
Two Hong Kong Bills on Interception of Communications
There were substantial similarities between the two Bills. Both proposed the
introduction of a warrant system controlled by the courts to replace the exist-
ing executive system. Yet there were serious concerns that such important
legislation had not been introduced by the Government. Some legislators
felt that the Government's White Bill was more specific in its terms. Some
simply believed the Government was better equipped to draft it, because the
subject matter required greater expertise and resources than could be offered
by Private Member legislation." Other legislators were concerned that the
Council might pass the Bill too hastily, without adequate time for consultation.
Nevertheless, most still agreed that some form of legislation on the intercep-
tion of telecommunications should be introduced before reunification. Since
13 Malone v. United Kingdom (1984) 7 E.H.R.R. 14. Applicant was charged with dishonest handling of
stolen goods. At trial, it was found that his telephone conversations had been tapped by police. After
his acquittal, the applicant instituted civil proceedings, seeking a declaration that the tapping of his
telephone conversations had been unlawful.
135 [bid., para 79.
136 The problems in the pre-1985 tapping procedures in England pointed out by the European Court of
Human Rights were more or less the same as the nine problem areas of s 33 listed in the Privacy
Repor.
13 This Bill can be found in Special Supplement No 5 to the Hong Kong Govemment Gazette, Feb 28,
1997, E33.
"3 Hong Kong Hansard, 27 June 1997 available at http://www.legco.gov.hk, p 1487.
3 Hong Kong Hansard, 23 Apr 1997, pp 258-263.
We Hong Kong Hansard, 27 June 1997 available at http://www.legco.gov.hk.
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the Government clearly had no intention of introducing its own Bill, the
legislators eventually agreed to To's private proposal, amending it as best they
could.
The Interception of Communications Bill was read for the third time on
27 June 1997.4 The final result was a compromise between the two earlier
Bills. Interception was to be allowed only for the purpose of investigating a
"serious crime", defined as "any offence punishable by a maximum period of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years". The duration of the court order would
be 90 days from issuance, with the possibility of one renewal for a further 90
days."' Most importantly, authorisation to intercept would require a court
order from the High Court."'
To date, the law is still not in effect. The HKSAR Government has so far
refused to sign the Interception of Communications Bill, claiming the amend-
ment was proposed without sufficient consultation with law enforcement
agencies. If implemented, the Bill would "seriously affect the ability of the law
enforcement agencies to fight serious crime and to safeguard the security of
Hong Kong". The Government says it needs time to review the law and study
its feasibility before implementation.'" James To has in turn threatened to
seek judicial review of the Government's reluctance to implement it.' In
August 2000, however, the Administration's review of the authorisation
system was said to be "off the agenda" for the time being. '
Tapping in Hong Kong Today
Telephone tapping continues in the HKSAR. The Hong Kong Standard claimed
in 1999 that more than 100 telephones were eavesdropped daily by the
Government, up to double the average number at any given time during the
colonial administration. Most of the tapping is related to the investigation of
corruption suspects, but some also relates to unspecified Hong Kong "security
matters"."' Despite long-running debate with LegCo on the proper bounds
of its tapping authority, the Government still refuses to officially disclose the
number of taps conducted annually.'"
Police and ICAC tapping resources and personnel were consolidated in a
"joint venture" agency, opaquely termed the Technical Services Department
(TSD), soon after dissolution of the Special Branch. Little is known of its
"4 Ibid.
1 Section 6, ICO.
1 Section 5, ICO.
144 HKSAR Government Press Release, "Review of the Interception of Communications Underway",
10 Nov 1999, available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199911/10/110179.htm.
1 "Legal Bid To Push Bill On Bugging", Hong Kong Standard, 27 Aug 1999. Michael Chungani and
Lillian Kwok, "Tung Stalls On Implementing Intrusion Law", Hong Kong Standard, 20 Sept 1999.
146 Glenn Schloss, "Careful - They May Hear You", SCMP, 21 Aug 2000.
14 Michael Chugani, "More Than 100 Phone Taps Daily", Hong Kong Standard, 29 Sept 1999.
14 Glenn Schloss (n 146 above).
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operations, except that the number of staff was around 176 during the last
four years of the 1990s, despite an increase of almost 40 per cent in annual
operating budgets over that period. Even this information, elicited by con-
cerned legislator James To, is inconclusive with regard to wire-tapping, as it is
believed some unknown portion of the TSD budget is allocated to other forms
of security operations.149
Overseas Developments in Political Policing
The United States - The FBI Changes its Role
What has changed since the handover with regard to political policing in
Hong Kong, and who now performs these functions? Before answering these
questions, it is worth reviewing developments in political policing elsewhere.
In the United States, the FBI shifted the focus of its monitoring efforts in
1976 from monitoring based on ideological grounds to specific sets of activities.
Priority targets for information gathering changed from subversive
organisations or individuals to criminal enterprises and terrorism. By 1983, it
could be said that "the FBI's domestic security role is criminal law enforce-
ment against terrorist violence and not the collection of political intelligence
about the expression of unorthodox opinions".s 0
However, the Bureau's change of focus from controlling internal subver-
sion to thwarting terrorism and criminal enterprise did not mean it would no
longer investigate the former. The change only meant that counter-subver-
sion work became hidden - lost in, or more precisely absorbed by, other
mandates. The substance remains the same, albeit in new forms.
Although the FBI may have quantitatively reduced its surveillance activi-
ties during the late 19 70s and early 1980s, the underlying criterion governing
earlier investigations - the political beliefs of the individual or group - con-
tinues to shape the Bureau's surveillance policy. Although the FBI now
rationalises its surveillance activities under the rubric of "terrorism" and "for-
eign intelligence", these activities do not seem substantively different from
those it had justified in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s under the rubric of "sub-
versive activities".1
Australia - ASIO and Similar Shifts in its Functions
A similar shift of priorities occurred in Australia. When the Australian Secu-
rity Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) was first established, "national security
was viewed in terms of radicalism" - left-wing organisations and individuals
1 Ibid
150 John T. Elliff, "The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Investigations" (1984) 69 Cornell Law
Review 785, 797.
151 Anthan G. Theoharis, "FBI Surveillance: Past and Present" (1984) 69 Cornell Law Review 883, 884.
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were regarded as subversive and thus detrimental to national security. As in
the United States, the declining political viability of subversion as a rhetori-
cal basis for security operations has driven ASIO to emphasise the monitoring
of threats that seem more immediate, including terrorism and "politically
motivated violence".' This change in terminology has not affected ASIO's
concerns with subversion, however. "Politically motivated violence", as ASIO
defines it, includes:
"acts that (i) involve violence or are intended or are likely to involve or
lead to violence (whether by the persons who carry on those acts or by
other persons); and (ii) are directed to overthrowing or destroying, or as-
sisting in the overthrow or destruction of, the Government or the
constitutional system of government of the Commonwealth or of a State
or Territory."'
This is no more than a modified restatement of the definition of subversion.
It is restrictive in the sense that it deletes the term "ultimately leads to" from
the description of acts in part (ii), presumably requiring that there be greater
immediacy to any potential threat to the State. Similarly, the 1986 reforms of
the ASIO Act focused on actual or prospective violence on political grounds,
a recognition of the right to political advocacy and legitimate dissent. "4 Critics
are quick to add, however, that the concept of "politically motivated vio-
lence" remains just as vague as "subversion" - it also includes acts that "threaten
or endanger any person or class of persons specified by the Minister". A loose
interpretation could provide justification for ASIO interfering with other-
wise lawful political advocacy and other civil activities that are not legitimate
security concerns.s15
Canada- Restructuring Counter-intelligence and Counter-terrorism
The Canadian Government dissolved the Counter-Subversion Branch of the
Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1988, following the
recommendation of a government-established committee. Many of its per-
sonnel were simply diverted to two sister branches: Counter-Intelligence and
Counter-Terrorism. Franks argued that disbanding the Counter-Subversion
Branch had not eliminated the problem of subversion, which the CSIS still
faced."' The restructured CSIS would still have to investigate subversive
152 Jenny Hocking, "Charting Political Space: Surveillance and the Rule of Law" (1994) 21 Sociallustice
66.
15 Section 2, ASIO Amendment Act 1986 (Cth Aust.).
1 Greg Came, "ASIO and Economic Espionage: The New 'Subversion'?" (1993) 19 Alternative Law
Journal 117, 119.
155 Jenny Hocking, "Charting Political Space: Surveillance and the Rule of Law" (1994) 21 SocialJustice
66; Greg Came, ibid.
156 C. E. S. Franks (n 5 above), p 4.
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activities. According to Gill, "it could be argued that removing separate
organisational status from counter subversion will mean that, to the extent
that the Service believes it necessary, the work will become hidden or 'lost' in
counter terrorism or counter intelligence"."I The reality of a continuing CSIS
concern with subversion is illustrated by the fact that the erstwhile Branch's
subversion files were not destroyed, but simply transferred to other
departments, along with its personnel.
Despite the lack of transparency in the changes involved, these examples
seem to highlight a shift in the underlying rationale of political policing op-
erations in more economically advanced political jurisdictions. This shift has
been towards a somewhat clearer statement of purpose and emphasis on ac-
tivities which more concretely threaten the State or general public order, but
away from terming "subversive" any activities which simply "might lead to"
possible threats to the State.
Security Wing of the Hong Kong Police Force
The Security Wing's Funding and Relationship with LegCo
Unfortunately, the Hong Kong Government has refused to release any infor-
mation on the reorganised security and intelligence structure in Hong Kong.
In March 1996, when the Appropriation Bill was tabled in the LegCo for
approval, the Secretary for Security requested HK$156.4 million in funding
for the 456 members of the new Security Wing of the Hong Kong Police
Force. The Secretary initially refused to explain the work of the Security
Wing to LegCo members on the grounds of confidentiality and sensitivity.158
He stated only that "[tihe Security Wing's duties are to maintain Hong Kong's
internal security"."' Not satisfied with this answer, LegCo Security Panel
Chairman James To threatened to reject the funding request.'w Under strong
pressure from legislators, the police finally agreed to brief them on the work
of the Security Wing on condition of confidentiality.'6'
After the briefing, James To acknowledged that certain duties of the Secu-
rity Wing, such as witness protection and anti-terrorist activities, were
necessary and deserving of support.' Furthermore, "if all the 456 posts
were to be deleted, those which are needed to carry out work that should be
15 Peter Gill, "Defining Subversion: The Canadian Experience Since 1977" (1989) Public Law 617,
633, 630.
'5 Angela Li, "Security Wing Funding Challenge Dropped", SCMP, 3 Apr 1996.
59 Angela Li, "Secrecy Sparks Funding Threat", SCMP, 22 Mar 1996.
160 Ibid.
161 Fung Wai-kong, "Legco Win In Row Over Role Of Police Wing", SCMP, 26 Mar 1996. See also Hong
Kong Hansard, 3 Apr 1996, p 110.
162 Hong Kong Hansard, 3 Apr 1996, p 107.
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supported would also be deleted".16' As a result, he withdrew his motion to
reject the funding on 3 April 1996. Other LegCo members who attended the
police briefing noted, however, that what they had heard was only "some
basic information",'" and "not sensitive information at all".165
Accountability
While approving the funding, To and other legislators expressed concerns
over the accountability of the Security Wing. They put forward two major
criticisms. First, at least some of the functions of the Security Wing "are vaguely
defined, subject to different interpretations by different authorities. As a result,
[this ambiguity] may lead to abuse of authority, thus adversely affecting the
right and freedom of the public."' 66 Second, the Security Wing lacks an effec-
tive accountability system. According to James To, "neither is the work of
the Security Wing governed by legislation, nor is there any machinery to
monitor its work".167 The Wing does not even produce an internal annual
report.'6' Emily Lau has suggested the establishment, as in other democratic
countries, of a special committee within or outside the legislature to "moni-
tor the work of secretive intelligence agencies on behalf of the community,
and ... submit reports to the legislature". 6 1
The Government's response was to affirm that:
"the Security Wing, just like other formations of the Police Force, is gov-
erned by the Police Force Ordinance and that all of its work is carried out
strictly in accordance with the laws of Hong Kong. The Commissioner of
Police and [the Secretary for Security] are accountable to [the Legislative
Council] for what it does or does not do and how effectively it performs its
role." 70
Succession to the Special Branch
After the establishment of the HKSAR, members of the Provisional Legisla-
tive Council (PLC) expressed concern about possible detriments to Hong
163 Ibid., p 108.
16 Ibid., p 109.
165 Ibid., p 108.
166 bid.
167 Ibid.
168 (bid., p 109.
169 ibid. In common law jurisdictions, judicial control over national security agencies is traditionally
weak. As Lord Diplock stated in the GCHQ case: "National security is the responsibility of the
executive government". Councilof Civil Service Unions v Ministerfor Civil Service [1984] 3 WLR 1174.
p 1198. But, with the exception of the US, the national security agencies in major Western democ-
racies are separate entities and often placed on a statutory basis. There are statutory institutions
(either ministerial or Parliamentary) to review the performance of these agencies and to hear com-
plaints against the agencies. See Lustgarten and Leigh (n 1 above) and H. P. Lee, P. J. Hanks and V.
Morabito, In the Name of National Security: The Legal Dimensions (LBC Information Services, 1995).
170 Hong Kong Hansard, 3 Apr 1996, p 110.
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Kong's security from the dissolution of the Special Branch. Legislator Ambrose
Lau specifically asked if political policing work had been taken up by any
other unit and, if so, whether that unit performed its job effectively. The
Administration did not answer him directly. Deputy Secretary for Security
Raymond Wong assured members of the PLC Panel on Security that "the
existing structure of the Police Force had been operating smoothly and the
Administration was satisfied that it could cope with the security requirements
of Hong Kong".' Tsang Yam-pui, Deputy Commissioner of Police
(Management), evasively claimed the police had no basis for comparison,
because it lacked records detailing the work of the former Special Branch.
The in-camera briefing he arranged on current Security Wing responsibilities,
mentioned above, was provided on condition that, pursuant to Police Inter-
nal Orders, information would only be disclosed on a "need-to-know
basis". 7 1 Members' subsequent frustration with the scope of the briefing con-
firmed that resolve. Responding to even more explicit questioning before the
full Council, the Secretary for Security again claimed ignorance of the previ-
ous agency. He offered only a bland assurance that "the Police Force have the
responsibility for the internal security of Hong Kong and are appropriately
structured to perform that role"."'
Speculation and Inference on the Succession
Almost immediately after the handover, the press began to allege Govern-
ment plans to organise a new political policing agency, effectively reconstituting
the Special Branch. One magazine claimed that after 1997 the mainland Gov-
ernment had already sent multiple envoys to Hong Kong to discuss reviving
the Special Branch. Embarrassment was the alleged motivation, because de-
spite mainland intelligence agencies' free reign to operate in the SAR, lack of
an institutional presence had reduced their ability to inspire local fear and
awe.' The Oriental Daily News also reported that the Security Wing had
recruited members of the police and other security departments for a new po-
litical "paparazzi" or surveillance team. Expected to begin full operations by
July 1998, after assembling 100 or more members, the political surveillance
team was described as "only the first step" in a plan to reorganise the Special
Branch."' By 2001, other sources saw a recent increase in police inspectors
171 Provisional Legislative Council, Panel on Security (Minutes), 18 Dec 1997, para 14.
172 Ibid., para 15. See also Jimmy Cheung, "Police to Monitor Debts Within Force", Hong Kong Standard,
19 Dec 1997.
173 Hong Kong Hansard, 14 Jan 1998, p 41. See also Helen Luk, "Changes Backed Despite Intelligence
Unit Mystery", SCMP, 15 Jan 1998.
1 Lang Ming, "Zhonggong Qianghua Gang Tewu Wang: Yaoqiu Xianggang Huifu Zhengzhibu" (CPC
Strengthening Hong Kong Spy Network: Seeks to Revive the Political Bureau), Zheng Ming, July
1998.
17 "Hong Kong Political Paparazzi is Operating Again", Tung FangJih Pao, 18 May 1998, as excerpted in
BBC Summan of World Broadcasts, 21 May 1998.
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posted to the Security Wing as a sign it was "to be made responsible for dealing
with the new workload which will be created by the Government's new-found
determination to monitor organisations such as Falun Gong, as well as the
future implementation of Article 23 legislation". Former Special Branch agents,
returned from retirement in Britain, were allegedly among those swelling the
Security Wing's ranks.'" Some claim the Administration, under pressure from
the Mainland to tighten political control, has been emboldened by public
apathy toward recent police crackdowns on right of abode and Falun Gong
activists."' Each new wave of speculation has been met by Government deni-
als of any plan to reorganise the Special Branch or empower another agency to
perform its role in political policing.
Conclusion: the Need for Accountability and Balance in Political
Policing in the HKSAR
The HKSAR Government has been firm in its denial of any plans to re-estab-
lish the Special Branch or restructure the current Police Security Wing."' Such
assurances can only amount to splitting hairs. There must be an equivalent to
the Special Branch in today's Hong Kong. Professing tolerance toward legiti-
mate dissent does not mean a government can afford to ignore developments
in the political landscape. The Hong Kong Government has a legitimate right
to collect intelligence on and watch certain radical political activities."' One
would have to doubt the capacity and effectiveness of the Hong Kong Police
if its Security Wing had no interest in the activities of organisations that
Beijing deems subversive. This is particularly true of overseas dissidents who
oppose the mainland regime, because of growing concerns from the Main-
land that Hong Kong might be used as a base for its subversion. Likewise, the
increasing activity of China's national security establishment in Hong Kong
encourages local prudence.'
176 Glenn Schloss, "Return of Big Brother", SCMP, 8 Mar 2002.
17 Chris Yeung, "The Politics of Public Order", SCMP, 16 May 2002.
178 Hong Kong Government Information Centre, "No Plans to Re-establish Special Branch", Daily In-
formation Bulletin, 23 Apr 1998, available at http://www.info.gov.hk.
17 Some people allege that radical democracy activists, particularly the April Fifth Action Group, were
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the Tell-tale Signs"', Hong Kong Standard, 20 Sept 1999; Michael Chungani and Lilian Kwok, "'Bad
Policemen' Give Boy Scare", Hong Kong Standard, 13 Oct 1999; and Stella Lee, "Security Team
'Tailed Activist"', SCMP, 5 Oct 1999.
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It is difficult to draw a line to protect legitimate dissident and political
advocacy while reserving the Government some power to combat genuine
threats to China's national security and Hong Kong's internal security.
Nonetheless, it is imperative that the line be drawn such that Hong Kong
remains free to pursue its democratic aspirations. The delicate balance that
courts strike in trials of a political nature should not only bind them, but also
the police who build the State's case. To ensure this occurs, the political po-
lice - whoever they are in Hong Kong - must be made accountable. Clear
legislation could help by making explicit both the scope of police powers and
the mechanisms for their accountability. Article 23 may be dangerous, in its
way, because politically-motivated trials conducted under its auspices could
prove repressive. But at least it will provide standardised court procedures,
opening political judgments to public scrutiny. Covert political policing is
even more dangerous to Hong Kong's way of life, because it affords no mean-
ingful accountability. Hong Kong's "Big Brother" very clearly needs to be
identified. Nor need the Government fear the loss of any legitimate power.
Greater accountability can only strengthen the long-term legitimacy of Hong
Kong's political police. That enhanced legitimacy will, in turn, strengthen
their effectiveness. The positive impact made by the ICAC on Hong Kong
life is rooted, among other things, in its political legitimacy. A similar show
of good faith should be made by Hong Kong's political police. They might
start by introducing themselves.
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